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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CLARK ROGERSON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
HANK GALETKA, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, et. al., 
Respondent/Appellees. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 960330 CA 
Comes now Petitioner/Appellant CLARK ROGERSON, appearing pr: 
se, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(Utah R. App. P.) and hereby respectfully submits the following 
opening Brief Memorandum regarding the dismissal of his claims ::: 
Third District Court that the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole held 
an untimely parole revocation hearing in his case. 
FACTS 
On or about November 22, 1994, Petitioner/Appellant was 
paroled from the Utah State Prison. Petitioner/Appellant was larer 
arrested on a Board of Pardons warrant on May 16, 1995, and he 
subsequently waived his rights to a pre-revocation hearing. On 
August 16, 1995, Petitioner /Appellant Rogerson appeared before the 
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Utah Board of Pardons and Parole for his parole revocation hearing. 
Petitioner's Board appointed counsel motioned for dismissal of the 
technical (non-felony, non-misdemeanor) parole violation charge of 
failing to attend therapy sessions based upon the Board's lack of 
timeliness in bringing the Petitioner/Appellant before them. This 
as ninety-one (91) days had elapsed since Petitioner/Appellant's 
arrest and detention on the Board warrant and neither the 
Petitioner/Appellant, the Board of Pardons, or counsel for either 
party had motioned for continuance according the Board's own rules. 
See R671-504 of the Utah Administrative Code (UAC). 
This motion for dismissal was denied by the Board hearing 
officer that Petitioner/Appellant initially appeared in front of, 
and Petitioner/Appellant was given a new parole release dare 
effective March 26, 1996, for his technical violation. However, on 
or about September 5, 1995, it appears that Petitioner/Appellant 
again appeared before the Board, although he was not allowed to be 
present for this hearing. Petitioner/Appellant's parole release 
date of March 26, '1996, was rescinded and he was scheduled for a 
rehearing (additional order to re-appear) in November 1996 with the 
additional stipulation that he undergo psychological testing. 
On the 19th of September, 1995, Petitioner/Appellant 
petitioned for extraordinary relief in the Third District Court and 
the case was assigned to Honorable David S. Young. On October 23, 
1995, Judge Young held a hearing, where after a short exchange 
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between Petitioner/Appellant and the Assistant Utah Attorney 
General, the petition was dismissed. Petitioner/Appellant 
subsequently filed a Motion to Amend or Alter the Judgment of 
dismissal on October 24, 1995, which was denied when the Court 
affirmed its decision of dismissal in a minute entry on November 
13, 1995. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE VIOLATED PETITIONER'S 
RIGHTS BY NOT CONDUCTING HIS PAROLE VIOLATION HEARING IN A TIMELY 
MANNER. 
Petitioner/Appellant contends that for the Utah Board of 
Pardons and Parole to have a rule where they say that parole 
violation (revocation) hearings will be held within ninety days of 
the offender's re-arrest and incarceration, see R671-504 Utah 
Administrative Code, then to exceed this limitation without good 
cause or "upon motion by inmate, counsel, or the Board," has 
violated his rights to a timely parole violation hearing. 
In Malek v. Sawava, 730 P.2d (Utah 1986), the issue of the 
Board1s own rules being mandatory or discretionary was before this 
Court. However, as can be seen from the decision in Malek, neither 
counsel for Malek, Mary Corporon, or the Utah Assistant Attorney 
General appearing in the case, Carlie Christensen, properly briefed 
this issue. Therefore, this Court did not have a fully developed 
record and/or argument upon which to base it's decision. The Court 
therefore only assumed that in the case of Malek the timeliness 
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rule/ then in the Utah Code, was discretionary. 
Now, the rules for the conduct of parole violation or 
revocation hearing are not only in the Utah Code, but the Board's 
own rules as set forth in the Utah Administrative Code. 
Petitioner/Appellant admits that mandatory language i 3 not pre5ent 
ii 1. ti le rule regarding timeliness of parole revocation hearing R671-
504 UAC, and that in Morrissev v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 
2593, 33 I ,.Ed.2d 484 (1972), the landmark case U.S. Supreme Court 
case regarding parole revocation, a delay or lapse of sixty (60) 
days was held to re not presumptively prejudicial. However, in the 
instant case, the Rule 671-504 specifically states that the parole 
revocation hearing will be held withi n ni net y ( 90 ) days unless the 
parolee, counsel, or the Board itself motions for a extension or 
continuance. This did not occur in this case. And although the 
Petitioner/Appellant's hearing was held almost right on the limit 
of the time period stated in the rule, it must be noted that his 
counsel motioned for dismissal, this was denied and 
Petitioner/Appellant was given a new parole release date for his 
technical violation. See Attachment #1, copy of Board's decision 
from August 1995 hearing. Then, the Board met again, well after 
any nine ty (90) day t ime per 1c cl, and withou b __ the 
Petitioner/Appellant being present, on September 5 , 1995, and 
decided Petitioner/Appellant's sentence again, iss^ ling him ar 1 order 
to re-appear in November 1996. See Attachment #2, copy of Board's 
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ievision f^-- ?ec~cr:--^ , 1995 hearing. This is a violation of 
Petitioner/Appellant's due process right to a Timely hearing, 
notwithstano: ro "he facr ur
 vvi r^r a m-^ present. •*_ rm;e Septerrujer 
5, 1995, hearing. Also, according this Court's logic as set forth 
in Labrum y. iTnh c 1. , of Pardons, ^Al ?.~ i :- , 907 (Utah 
1993) (parole is sentencing under Utah's indetermination sentencing 
system), Petitioner/Appellant was given multiple sentences for the 
same technical parole violation which is a violation of both the 
Utah and federal Constitutions regarding multiple 
punishments/doi ib.I <- : e /•par::"/. 
II. THE UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND' PAROLE VIOLATED 
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS BY NOT ACCORDING THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT THE 
"RIGHTS AND CONSIDERATIONS" THAT WERE IN EFFECT UPON HIS INITIAL 
HEARING. 
In one Utah Administrative Code (UAC) , R671-301-1 states that 
the offender "will be afforded all the rights and consiaerations 
that were in effect upon his initial parole hearing," This 
logically follows as the setting of a parole release date is still 
n +- i o o n o C o o D u 7 1 _ Q f V _ "• T1-1 •7^ A Hrrv -' ^ ^ o -*- -v~ ->+--? T -»- Q ^ ^ r^ r> [ TJ7\ r* \ 
d u i o o u c . ubfa rv o / -L J KJ ±. J_ U L a u .H-CLux i.. _ ;D ^ _ ci L. ~ v e ^ ^ ' J c \ un 1 ^ ; . 
As evidenced from the case numbers listed for 
Petitioner/Appellant's offenses on Attachments #1 and #2, 
Petitioner/Appellant first appeared before the Utah Board of 
Pardons in approximately 1977. Although the rules and statutes of 
the Board and the State of Utar i i lave changed since 197 7, the Board 
itself recognizes by enacting this rule that those offenders who 
must re-appear before the Board should oe givei i consideration under 
iihe same rules in effect when they committed their initial offense. 
See e.g. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 
17 (1981) (Ex posr, facto prevents enactment of laws that either 
impose punishments for acts not punishable at the time they were 
committed or increase punishment over that previously prescribed) . 
The Board had no provision for "taking the 
Petitioner/Appellant under advisement." This violation of 
Petitioner-Appellant's rights requires remedy before this Court. 
III. THE UZAh iioru^ wi PARDONS AND PAROLE VIOLATED 
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND UTAH STATE LAW (OPEN PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT) 
BY NOT CONDUCTING H: PAROLE VIOLATION HEARING IN AN OPEN SESSION. 
According the Utah Code Title 77 Section 27 and the Utah Board 
of Pardons own rules as contained within the Utah Administrative 
Code (UAC) the "Board of Pardons hearings shall be open to the 
pub 1 i ' " iirr "^^ 1 -":'' • :>~~1 :1' '. See also Ai iarews v: Utah Bd. of 
Pardons, 836 P.2d 790, (Utah 1992). This comports to a basic 
fairness. 
However, in the Petitioner-Appellant's case the Board violated 
this precept. Petitioner/Appellant initially appeared, i n front of 
the Board on August 16, 1995, and was given a new parole release 
date effective March 26, 1996, for his technical violation. 
However, on or aoout September 5, 1995, Petitioner/Appellant again 
appeared before the Board, although he was not allowed to be 
present for this hearing, nor was he given any notice of this 
hearing. Petitioner/Appellant's parole release date of March 26, 
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1996, granted at the August 16, 1995 hearing was rescinded and he 
was scheduled for a rehearing (additional order to re-appear) in 
November 1996 with the additional stipulation that he undergo 
psychological testing. 
This is a clear violation of several state and federal laws 
and constitutional provisions, including the Utah Open Public 
Meetings Act. See Utah Code Ann. S2_ - _H_ -_J_ e_L seq. For the 
touchstone of due process is the protection of the individual from 
arbitrary action by the government. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 
U.S. 114, 123 (1889); Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. At 665 
(quoting from Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)). Not 
only must an individual be given notice and an opportunity to 
respond to the allegations or material to be used against him, very 
important in such a case as this where the Utah Board of Pardons 
performs a sentencing function, but implicit in the concept of due 
process as well are the ideas that government must follow its own 
rules and that it must do so within a reasonable time. See Layton 
v. Swapp, 484 F.Supp. 958 (D.Utah 1979). 
Here it appears the Board met on the very limit of it's own 
rule on timely hearings, see Rule 671-504 UAC, then almost three 
weeks later met in an illegal, closed session to change the first 
decision in Petitioner-Appellant Rogerson's case. Questions also 
arise about the basic fairness of such a hearing where the 
Petitioner-Appellant was not allowed to be present, and whether the 
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Petitioner-Appellant was prejudiced by his assertion of his rights 
at the August 16, 1995 hearing where he had counsel motion for 
dismissal of the technical parole violation charge as untimely. 
See e.g. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 839 P.2d 874 (Utah App. 
1992). 
The record in Petitioner's case, although it was not allowed 
to be developed in the District Court due to the dismissal by Judge 
Young, would have shown that Petitioner-Appellant Rogerson had 
completed any and ail therapies and programs the Board had 
previously required of him. The stipulation added at the 
unconstitutional September 5, 1995 closed Board hearing is in 
effect an additional punishment meted out to the Petitioner-
Appellant for the assertion of his rights at an earlier hearing. 
This is blatantly illegal. The United States Constitution forbids 
retaliation against a person for exercising a statutory or 
constitutional right. Blackledae v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 
2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). Such actions by the Board are similar 
to "star chambers'7 of ancient jurisprudence which are both illegal 
and counterproductive to our current system of justice. 
Conclusion 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing facts and argument, the 
Petitioner-Appellant respectfully requests this honorable Court 
rule that the Third District Court, Judge David S. Young presiding, 
abused his discretion in dismissing Petitioner-Appellant's Petition 
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for Extraordinary Relief. Further, Petitioner-Appellate requests 
this Court, upon the issuance of a declaration of Petitioner-
Appellant's rights as a technical parole revocation hearing, 
remand to the lower court for a full evidentiary hearing, to the 
ultimate end of Petitioner-Appellant's re-instatement upon parole 
or, in the alternative, full discharge from custody of the 
Department of Corrections. 
DATED this 3 f ^ day of ___ M^ 1996, 
C-WyTC / V 
^ CLARK ROGERSON 
Appearing Pro Se 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
< ^ * » r I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the JL% l da/ 
of *??ISUA, , 1996, I mailed, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to: 
Ms. Nancy L. Kemp, Esq. 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents/Appellees 
/ k> O g a ^ £ £>a ^£cr*c^<£-
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Name "j %cS?|f USP # 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RATIONALE FOR DECISION ON FOR 
Hearing Date Hearing Type 
The Board of Pardons1 decifiHtofr^ 
AGGRAVATING . MITIGATIKG 
OFFEJTOER nD BACKGROUND 
Criminal history significant^ underrepresented by guidelines 
(i.e., more than 4 felony convictions and/or 8 misdemeanors) 
/ History of similar offenses 
/ / / Pattern of increasingly or decreasingly serious offenses 
'y/V History of unsuccessful 01 lyV^ History of unsuccessful or successful supervisions 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE
 } , „ 
Use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities ' ' / ^. * -~ / use or weapons or dangerous ins trumen can Lies „ (>^ v»' 
/ Demonstration of extreme cruelty or depravity ^ * ^ v 
~r Abuse of position of trust, special skill, or responsibility i 
Multiple incidents and/or victims v 
J, 
:iple 
Personal gain reaped from the offense 
**Jra, ^OFFENDER'S TRAITS DURING THEJt OFFENSE 
^ + Motive^ (intentional, prerfreditafefed V£. impulsive, reactionary) f Role (organizert leader v&. follower, minimal participant) V Obstruction of lustice vs. earlv withdrawal or self-surrenc 
-&9&i 
jus £ y der . 
VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS 
Extent of injury (physical} emotional, financial, social) 
Relatively vulnerable victim vg.^ aggr^LS^i^e' or' provoking victim 
Victim in position of authority"tJVer^offender 
/IJei^ai^d^^ of responsibility 
* ' Repeated, numerous' v&. first/incarceration or parole-xevoca^Jjqn 
' / ^c.fcs-bgrnt;- cfc^ -remorse and apparent motivation ta rehabilitate 7 . . ^ _ 
^S Tiipel&ess^ aridt.e^tent^fe£|or£s t o w restitution, .„._. •%^m^^^^m^r, 
I Frison programming (effort to ^ enroll, nature of programmingr . 
Prison disciplinary problems or other defiance or authority . • 
Employment possibilities (history, skills, current job, future) 
Extent of community fear, condemnation . 
Degree of meaningful support system . . . . . . 
Nature and stability of release plans 
Unusual institutional vulnerability (due to age, health, other) 
Overall rehabilitative progress and promise . . . 
Lengthy history of alcohol/drug abuse v&. apparent rehabilitation 
Substantial continuous period in custody on other charges • . • 
Likely release to detainer . ± 
OTHER 
> " • 
flfeed updated pfu fepfT -fe nv\*w -risk"1- y 
Date / Board Member 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE OBSCIS MO. 99914009 
Consideration of the Status "of RQGERSQN, CLARK T_, PRISON NO. 14009 
Tne above-entitled matter came on for consideration before the Utah State Board 
of Pardons on the 5th day of September, J:99:5, for: 
PAROLE AGREEMENT VIOLATION 
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing3 the Board 
ma^as tne foiiOv7iu-< decision and order: 
REoJLi 3_ 
Revoke Lr/22/1994 parole* Renaariag set 
for ii/193-5 vita an Alienist report due 
prior to hearing. 
Modification of interim decision of "JS/IO^ 
to oarole on 03/26/96. 
No Crime Sent Case No. dad^-: Aspiration 
Tnis decision Is subject to review and modification oy the Board of Pardons 
any tiiae until iCtuai release from custody. 
By order of tue Board of Paraons of the State of Utaii, I have this date 
otn day of Septemper, 1995, affixed tay signature as Tnairnaa for and 
on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
The status of R.QGZRSOH, ::iARX T , US? Nu. 14G09 , 033-.:i2 Mo, 9991hjQ9 
came before the Utan State Boara or Pardons for a Purole la vocation Iiearing on 
the iota day of August. 1995. 
Schedule reueari ig for 
\/_ Qthac-. ((jipwjpii jyitrhtMA -h~fBA.WMC((!il^a:fiM^ OPn Q Oritur 
-ft oh tJLjmhmdmhiipMwd. < — -*-
The reasons for this decision are identified on tne ,.3ttacnad page. 
At the discretion of can Board of Pardons, this decision is subject to review 
and modification at J.^y tiiae prior to actual release iron custody. 
3y order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I affix my signature 
on behalf or tne Caairmaa ot the 3oard this loth day of August, 1995, 
Name ^x^s^1"*? 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
/^  / 
RATIONALE FOR DECISION ON A? /?*< 9^ FOR /^Vo ^ . l/ •v'Jns^ 
Hearing Date Hearing Type 
The Board of Pardons' decision is based, on the following factors: 
AGGRAVATING MITIG, 
OFFENDER.19RJBACKGRODND 
Criminal history significantiy:«nderrepresented by guidelines 
(i.e., more than 4 felony convictions and/or 8 misdemeanors) 
^
 y History of similar offenses "**~ 
y< Pattern of increasingly or decreasingly serious offenses . . . 
History of unsuccessful or successful supervisions . . . . . . 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE 
Use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities 
Demonstration of extreme cruelty or depravity 
Abuse of position of trust, special skill, or responsibility 
Multiple incidents and/or victims 
Personal gain reaped from the offense 
OFFENDERS TRAITS DURING THE OFFENSE 
Motive (intentional, premeditated vs. impulsive, reactionary) . 
Role (organizer^ leader v&. follower, minimal participant) . . 
Obstruction of justice vg. early withdrawal or self-surrender • 
VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS 
Extent of injury (physical? emotional, financial, social) 
Relatively vulnerable victim vs.. aggressive or provoking victim 
Victim in position of authority over offender 
OFFENDER'S PRESENT CHARACTERISTICS 
Denial or minimization vs. complete acceptance of responsibility 
X Repeated, numerous vs.. first incarceration or parole revocation 
Extent or remorse and apparent motivation to rehabilitate . . • 
Timeliness and extent OL efforts to pay restitution 
Prison pr-^n^-pin? f .-"fort ~^o enroll^ r.a^ ire of programming) . 
Prison disciplinary prooierns or other aer^ance or authority . , 
Employment possibilities (history, skills, current job, future) 
Extent of community fear, condemnation * . . . . 
Degree of meaningful support system . . . . . . . . . 
Nature and stability of release^plans • • . • v «* . . . . . . . 
Unusual institutional vulnerability (due to age, health, other) 
Overall rehabilitative progress and promise,^ . . . . . . . . . 
Lengthy history of alconol/dru^abuse vs. apparent rehabilJ ration 
Substantial continuous period in custody on other charges . . . 
Likely release to detainer -v. *L." 
~ -*k ~~ 
0T9ER 
& ?/^>NU- -f^ ^ -O-J-IAJU^ -V. f ^  i-vtd? « r ^v ^L 1/ /Ui</L^^/U_, 
~M' 
I 
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